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This paper discusses whether and if so how two major contemporary 
problems, climate change and financial pressures on welfare states, should 
be tackled in conjunction. It compares different climate change mitigation 
instruments and argues that policies which share out the revenue that they 
raise on an equal per capita basis to all citizens are both effective in reducing 
CO2 emissions and capable of preventing regressive effects that other 
emission reduction policies often generate. However, such schemes are not a 
long-term solution to general pressures on welfare state finances. They are 
perhaps best seen as temporary measures to enable a managed transition to 
a low carbon society, a process which might well be essential to maintain 
social stability, and therefore for the continued existence of the welfare state. 
 
1. Introduction 
This paper addresses the question of whether two immensely significant 
problems that today’s welfare states face can be tackled in conjunction and if 
so how. The two problems that we are referring to are imminent financial 
pressures on welfare states and the urgency of mitigating catastrophic climate 
change. At first sight, these two sets of problems may seem unrelated. 
However, we will argue in this paper that tackling these problems together 
may be necessary and will definitely be advantageous. In short, mitigating 
climate change can generate new sources of government revenue which can 
be “recycled” in ways that have redistributive effects. In fact, if climate change 
                                                
1 Author affiliations: Dr Milena Büchs, School of Social Sciences, University of Southampton; 
Sebastian Duwe, Hertie School of Governance, Dr Nicholas Bardsley, National Centre of 
Research Methods, University of Southampton. Correspondence address: 
m.buechs@soton.ac.uk.    2 
mitigation policies are adopted without taking their potentially regressive 
effects into account, they will harm some of the most vulnerable groups in 
society. This might make them politically unworkable. This paper will 
particularly focus on proposals for climate change mitigation instruments that 
would share out the revenue that they generate to the population on an equal 
per capita basis. We will discuss a range of questions to investigate the 
adequacy of those proposals to address the issues of both the imminent 
financial crisis of the welfare state as well as climate change. First, a brief 
overview will be provided of different climate change mitigation policies’ 
design principles and potential effectiveness. Second, we review the literature 
on the distributional effects of existing and hypothetical climate mitigation 
policies.  
Within the scientific community, there is now a consensus that 
anthropogenic climate change is a reality and that if we do not act very 
rapidly, we may not be able to prevent catastrophic and potential abrupt 
climate change which would inflict immense economic and social cost. The 
main cause of climate change is the emission of “greenhouse gases” (GHGs), 
including inter alia carbon dioxide (CO2), methane, nitrous oxide, and the 
refrigerant gases CFCs and HFCs, from human activities. Such emissions can 
be regarded as negative externalities of market behaviour. This means that 
economic actors have powerful incentives to emit – as the pricing 
mechanisms does not reflect the damage that the emissions cause –, even 
though collectively everyone suffers adverse consequences. Moreover, 
greenhouse gas emissions are a global externality or uniform pollutant (OECD 
2001). That is, no matter where emissions occur, their impact will be felt 
globally – however in different ways and to varying degrees across the globe 
– and for a considerable time into the future as GHGs remain in the 
atmosphere for up to 100 years. Given the long term nature of the impacts the 
problem can also be seen as an ethical generational issue, with the present 
generation profiting at the expense of the life chances of future generations. 
However, the scientific evidence provided by one of the major players 
in the area of climate change, the Intergovernmental Panel on Climate   3 
Change
2 is not disputed by any scientific body of national or international 
standing, and within the sciences themselves there is a remarkable degree of 
consensus on the reality of anthropogenic global warming (Oreskes 2004) 
which is based on physics-based knowledge of the so-called “greenhouse 
effect”. This is the mechanism through which GHGs act to trap incident 
radiation from the sun, warming the earth’s surface, an insulating effect 
without which the planet would be too cold to support life (Houghton 2004). 
Scientific evidence includes data on manifest changes in the climate such as 
rising surface temperatures and sea levels, accelerated melting of ice caps 
and permafrost as well as more frequent occurrence of severe weather 
phenomena such as flooding, hurricanes and droughts. Evidence that climate 
change is mostly due to human emissions of GHGs derives from its close 
correlation to rising emissions from fossil fuel use since the Industrial 
Revolution (IPCC 2007; McKay 2008: 5ff.).  
Research based on more recent data suggests that the IPCC’s 
assumptions about the scale and pace of climate change as well as the 
targets for atmospheric greenhouse gas concentrations that it endorsed were 
understated (Anderson and Bows 2008; Hansen, Mki. Sato et al. 2008), 
increasing the urgency to act. In addition, whilst there is still considerable 
uncertainty regarding the question of how the atmospheric concentration of 
GHGs and its increase translate into rising global average temperatures, there 
is a growing number of scientists warning that the target endorsed by the 
IPCC of a concentration of 450 parts per million (ppm) CO2 equivalent (e) is 
too high and that to prevent dangerous climate change and an average global 
temperature rise by more than 2 degrees Celsius
3 we should aim to bring the 
atmospheric concentration of GHGs down to at least 350 ppm CO2e, very 
likely even less than that (Hansen, Mki. Sato et al. 2008).
4 It has also been 
estimated that targets of emission reductions of 80% in developed countries 
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by 2050
5 in comparison to the 1990 baseline is unlikely to reduce the 
atmospheric concentration of GHGs to 450ppm (PIRC 2008: 15).
6  
We therefore assume that drastic action to reduce CO2 emissions is 
required, as the policies currently in place which will not suffice to stabilise the 
global climate. At the same time, it must be acknowledged that carbon 
reduction policies potentially have considerable regressive effects as they 
tend to increase the cost of energy – and therefore of other goods and 
services – on which low income households spend a higher proportion of their 
income than high income households. Indeed, this is a general feature of 
taxes on non-luxury consumer goods or policies that generate price increases 
of those items.  
However, mitigating such regressive effects implies additional 
government expenditure at a time during which European welfare states find 
themselves under increasing financial pressure. According to Eurostat data, 
governments within the EU-27 (EU-15) spent on average 26.9 (27.5) per cent 
of GDP on social benefits and services. Whilst this figure has remained fairly 
stable during the last decade, welfare state scholars assume that there will be 
an increasing demand for welfare spending in the time to come (e.g. Pierson 
2001; Starke 2006). This is firstly due to „ageing societies” in which both the 
ratio of the population above retirement age to the working-age population as 
well as average life-expectancy are rising. These developments generate 
higher demands for pension payments as well as health and long-term care 
provisions whilst the basis of welfare funding is decreasing due to the 
shrinking proportion of the working-age population that provides the main 
source of revenue through its tax and social security contribution payments. In 
addition, the current economic recession and related increasing 
                                                
5 For example, this target has been adopted for the UK in the 2008 Climate Change Act. 
6 The social and economic challenges that these emissions reductions pose can be illustrated 
by the following considerations. Andersen & Bows, for example, modelled different GHG 
emissions reduction scenarios and estimate that if an atmospheric concentration of 450ppm 
CO2e is to be achieved and if global GHG emissions peak by 2020, annual post-peak 
reduction rates of between 8 and 33 per cent are required (Anderson and Bows 2008: 3877). 
They regard this option as politically unacceptable, however, the scenario in which emissions 
peak in 2015, requiring post-peak annual emission reductions of at least 4 per cent is still 
hugely demanding (ibid.). The scale of this challenge becomes apparent by the fact that GHG 
emissions in Russia decreased by 5 per cent per year for a decade in the aftermath of the 
Soviet Union’s collapse (ibid: 3878).   5 
unemployment within the EU will drive expenditure for working-age related 
benefits upwards, at least in the near future.  
This rising demand for expenditure is however confronted with several 
limitations to increasing welfare state resources. According to Eurostat, total 
state revenues within the EU-15 have remained fairly stable during the last 
decade, having decreased slightly from 46.6 per cent of GDP in 1996 to 45.3 
per cent in 2006. Within the EU-15, 58.9 per cent (in 2006) of public social 
expenditure was financed by social security contributions paid by employers 
and employees. There appears to be little scope for increasing social security 
contributions as many EU and OECD governments, also following the advice 
from those organisations, sought to decrease these non-wage labour costs 
which are perceived as detrimental to their businesses’ competitiveness in 
comparison to those in the US or Japan. Taxes are another important source 
of welfare state funding. However, increasing certain types of taxes is also 
considered problematic from a competitiveness point of view. For instance, 
raising tax rates on corporate income and profits, capital or capital 
transactions is often regarded as diminishing businesses’ competitiveness 
within internationalised economies. Alternatively, businesses might be able to 
evade such tax increases by re-locating their operations into countries with 
lower tax rates. Difficulties are also attached to increasing taxes on personal 
income as this potentially reduces work incentives, particularly in the low-
wage sector. These pressures may be partly responsible for recent trends in 
taxing structures according to which the rates on corporate and high level 
personal income have decreased considerably during the last decade whilst 
indirect taxes (such as VAT and excise duties) have increased (European 
Commission 2009). However, the disadvantage of increasing indirect taxes is 
that they are regressive. 
Rising demands for social expenditure could in principle be financed 
through public deficits. However, monetarist macro-economic approaches 
have largely replaced neo-Keynesianism since the 1980s, de-legitimising 
deficit spending as a macro-economic instrument. In addition, the European 
Monetary Union (EMU) has set clear limits to annual (3% of GDP) and overall 
(60% of GDP) public deficits for members of the Euro area. Whilst the EMU 
has often been criticised as ineffective, actual public deficits have decreased   6 
from 73.8 (69.9) per cent in 1997, the year in which the Stability and Growth 
Pact was adopted, to 66.4 (60.4) per cent in 2007 within the Euro area
7 (EU-
15). Currently deficit financing is undergoing something of a renaissance in 
response to the current banking and economic crisis, but this is being 
presented as a temporary emergency measure to be matched by future 
spending cuts. 
This brief review of two major contemporary problems, climate change 
and increasing financial pressures on welfare states, demonstrates that whilst 
urgent action is required to reduce CO2 emissions, there is little room in 
current welfare budgets to address likely regressive effects of those policies. 
However, could sufficient revenue be raised through CO2 reduction policies 
that can be used to avoid regressive effects? Could the revenue even be used 
to tackle increasing financial pressures on welfare states? To be able to 
discuss these questions we will briefly review different design principles of 
climate mitigation policies in the following section.  
 
2. Climate mitigation policies 
The literature identifies different policy tools to tackle climate change. First of 
all, one can distinguish regulation from economic instruments, whilst 
economic instruments comprise measures such as subsidies, taxation and 
cap and trade schemes (Helm 2005; Stern 2007). 
The main feature of traditional command-and-control regulation, is a 
prescribed level of pollution abatement. It makes use of “institutional 
measures aimed at directly influencing the environmental performance of 
polluters by regulating processes or products used, by abandoning or limiting 
the discharge of certain pollutants, and/or by restricting activities to certain 
times, areas, etc.” (OECD 1994). This leaves the polluter with no alternative 
other than to comply with the regulation or face penalties for non-compliance. 
Because of the equal burden put on all polluters irrespective of their specific 
abatement costs, environmental regulation is considered to be cost-inefficient. 
For this reason, economic instruments have gained prominence in the field of 
environmental policy.  
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Economic instruments “affect estimates of the costs and benefits of 
alternative actions open to economic agents” (OECD 1994). They differ from 
traditional regulation in so far as they work through the market mechanism 
rather than through a distinct mechanism. Four types of economic instruments 
can be distinguished: taxes, subsidies, tradable emissions permits, and 
deposit refund schemes (OECD 1994). The main debates in this area concern 
the question of whether carbon taxes or tradable emission permits are the 
more suitable policy tool.  
“A carbon tax is a fee imposed on fossil fuels, and other primary 
products (e.g., refrigerants), based on the amount of greenhouse gases they 
emit” (WRI 2008). Hence, it establishes a constant price for carbon emissions 
which contributes to cost security for producers. Carbon taxes as well as other 
“green” taxes can be characterised as a Pigovian tax “that is, a tax designed 
to internalize negative externalities into the price system” (Herber and Raga 
1995).
8 A carbon tax would therefore introduce a charge for the pollution of 
the atmosphere and the potential damage caused by climate change into the 
price of energy. However, carbon taxes do not provide environmental security 
because the level of emission reduction depends on economic actors’ 
responses to the tax. If demand is price inelastic, the level of emissions 
reduction will be limited.
9 The fact that price elasticity of oil demand is 
relatively low and therefore inelastic (Cooper 2003; Hamilton 2009), 
particularly in the short run, indicates that price elasticity of demand related to 
a carbon tax would also be inelastic as such a tax primarily increases the 
price of fossil fuels such as petroleum products and gas.  
Scholars within tax policy and labour economics nonetheless typically 
argue that Pigouvian taxes generate a “double dividend”: Whilst the tax sets 
incentives to reduce the activities which give rise to externalities, the revenue 
can be recycled for any other social purpose and also be used to reduce 
taxes on income or capital. From a neo-classical perspective, this would 
reduce market distortions that those taxes might imply, for example 
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restraining work incentives. These principles have been followed through the 
introduction of the “eco tax” in Germany in 1999 and the 2001 UK Climate 
Change Levy. The “eco tax” taxes electricity and petroleum, whilst the Climate 
Change Levy is a tax on a range of energy commodities only payable by 
businesses in different sectors. In Germany, the revenue from the “Eco Tax” 
is partially used to decrease the social security contributions for old-age 
pensions; in the UK, employers’ national insurance contributions have been 
cut by 0.3 per cent to compensate them for the higher energy cost.  
In contrast to carbon taxes, emissions trading or “cap and trade” 
schemes achieve environmental certainty because the overall volume of 
emissions is capped at a certain level which ideally decreases over time. 
(Henceforth we shall call these cap and trade schemes, since it is the cap 
aspect that drives their environmental impact, and the trading is a secondary, 
efficiency consideration.) However, they may entail economic uncertainty as 
the price of emission permits is determined by the market. Under a cap and 
trade scheme, participating entities (e.g. companies, organisations, 
individuals) require emission permits to cover their emissions. As emission 
permits can be traded, entities can buy additional permits if their emissions 
exceed their initial allocation or sell permits if they remain below their 
“budget”. If emissions occur that are not covered by a permit, substantial 
financial sanctions apply. This allows for a competitive market of permits to 
develop. Companies that have the lowest abatement costs will reduce their 
emissions in order to sell their assigned permits to companies with higher 
abatement costs. Design options such as banking, borrowing and price-caps 
can be used to fine-tune cap and trade schemes to economic circumstances. 
Emissions will therefore be reduced to the required level at lowest possible 
cost.  
Carbon taxes and cap and trade schemes have various similarities. 
Importantly both aim to correct for the market failure caused by negative 
externalities. They include the costs of emitting GHG into prices in order to 
avoid excessive pollution. They do so by creating a price for carbon which 
generates incentives to promote more environmental-friendly behaviour and 
processes. With regard to the question of this paper it is central that in   9 
contrast to traditional regulation both instruments (can)
10 generate revenue. 
“How such revenues are used becomes an important issue in both systems” 
(PEW Centre 2009). Both tools can be implemented at any point in the 
production chain from fossil fuel production (upstream) to ultimate fuel 
combustion (downstream). An upstream approach would reduce the 
administrative burden of a smaller target group and increase efficiency 
because it would include most emitters. “In contrast, downstream programs 
necessarily exclude small sources (as does the EU Emissions Trading 
Scheme, or EU ETS)” (Parry and Pizer 2007: 81).
11 Regardless of the design, 
both a carbon tax and a cap and trade scheme require monitoring, reporting 
and verification to ensure enforcement if companies do not comply with the 
rules.  
The main difference is that the carbon tax ensures cost certainty 
whereas cap and trade ensures environmental certainty (PEW Centre 2009). 
“(T)radeable permit programs would reduce CO2 emissions to a specific level 
with the control cost handled efficiently, but not at a specific cost level. Carbon 
taxes would effectively cap marginal control costs at the specific tax level, but 
the precise level of CO2 reduction achieved would be less certain” (Parker 
2004). This partly explains why many environmentalists prefer cap-and-trade 
schemes over taxes. Most politicians also prefer emission trading because 
they fear public uproar caused by implementing a new and potentially 
regressive tax. Nevertheless, the permit price varies with economic boom-
bust cycles while the tax rate remains constant over time. Whilst national 
governments have so far favoured (their versions of) cap and trade schemes 
over carbon taxation – also because it seemed more attractive to them to link 
different trading schemes gradually from the bottom up to address the global 
nature of climate change than to implement regional (e.g. within the EU) or 
global carbon taxes – an effective global scheme will eventually be needed to 
achieve the required reductions of CO2 emissions.  
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The design of a well-functioning cap and trade scheme is a hot topic of 
debate. As a rather new tool, only few lessons can be drawn from real-world 
experiences.
12 Several questions are at the centre of attention. First, policy 
makers must decide which industries and emissions to target. This choice 
depends on available data and the technical skills to measure emissions from 
different sources and will directly influence the compliance cost for industry. 
The next step is to settle on a mechanism of how the permits are distributed. 
“Allocation of allowances is clearly the most complex and politically charged 
element of the emission trading design, whether domestic or 
international“(OECD/IEA 2002). Permits can be either given away for free (so-
called grandfathering), auctioned off, updated (in this procedure the number of 
allocated permits is reconsidered over time), or a combination of those. Policy 
makers will seek to find the best trade-off between competitiveness and inter-
industry cost burden sharing. In contrast to a carbon tax, revenue will be only 
raised through cap and trade if at least a partial auctioning of permits takes 
place. The allocation mechanism has lasting effects on the redistributive 
effects of the trading scheme.  
The permits can be held by private companies, the state/government or 
citizens (Haas and Barnes 2007: 5). Under the European Union Emissions 
Trading Scheme (EU ETS), the largest currently existing trading scheme 
worldwide, the permits are mainly given away for free
13 to polluting 
companies, generating immense windfall profits for them. For instance, 
German energy facilities reaped 35.5 bn Euros from 2008 to 2012 alone 
(Matthes 2008). If governments opt to auction off the permits they generate 
additional state revenue. Whilst the state would generally be free to use this 
revenue for various purposes, one possibility would be to ring-fence the 
revenue for investment in measures that assist a transition to a zero carbon 
economy and society through energy efficiency, renewables, zero-carbon 
public transport, reforestation, etc. (Tickell 2008).  
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The drawback of allocating the revenue to the government is that the 
government cannot necessarily be trusted to spend resource income wisely 
(Haas and Barnes 2007). The example of Alaska demonstrates this very well. 
The Alaska Permanent Fund, an independent body that issues part of the 
revenue from Alaska’s oil resources directly back to the citizens, was 
introduced because the first windfall profits from 1969 to 1977 were not used 
efficiently by the government (Fitzpatrick 1999: 148).  
This third major option, allocating the revenue amongst citizens on an 
equal per capita basis, would perform three functions: “it would reflect a 
common ownership of resource, it would promote third-sector non-state, non-
market social economies and it would compensate for the regressive effects 
of ecotaxes” (Fitzpatrick 1999: 193). 
Recently, various proposals for CO2 reduction policies have been put 
forward that rebate citizens with equal per capita shares of the revenue that 
these policies generate. The first is a proposal for a tax and share scheme, 
whilst the second and third are essentially upstream trading schemes with 
minor differences in design, called Cap and Share (FEASTA 2008) and Cap 
and Dividend (Barnes 2003). A tax and dividend scheme for the USA is 
currently promoted (amongst others) by James Hansen, a climate scientist 
from the National Aeronautics and Space Administration (NASA). Hansen 
proposes to levy a tax on the CO2 content of all fossil fuels at the point of 
production or first sale at a level that is sufficient to significantly reduce CO2 
emissions. The revenue would be fully reallocated to the citizens on an equal 
per capita basis (Hansen 2009). 
In contrast, both Cap and Share and Cap and Dividend are upstream 
trading schemes. A cap would be set on the introduction of fossil fuels into the 
economy at a level such that overall CO2 emissions are reduced to a required 
level. The cap could be set once or twice a year and would be reduced step 
by step to eventually reach the required long-term reduction target. This target 
would be set by an independent scientific commission. In both schemes, the 
share from selling the carbon allowances to the fossil fuel providers would be 
redistributed to the citizens on an equal per capita basis.  
The difference between the two schemes is the way in which the share 
is handed back to the citizens. Within Cap and Dividend, an independent trust   12 
would sell the carbon permits to the fossil fuel companies and then share out 
the revenue to the public. Within Cap and Share, each citizen would be given 
a certificate, entitling them to sell an equal per capita emission allowance via 
banks or post offices to the fossil fuel providers. The advantage of Cap and 
Dividend is that it would involve fewer transactions by individual citizens whilst 
Cap and Share’s advantage is that there is less involvement of an 
independent trust whose democratic legitimacy and accountability may be 
weak and that individual citizens can further reduce the amount of emission 
permits issued by refraining from selling them.
14 Within both schemes, the 
independent trust could retain part of the certificates/revenue to spend it on 
additional climate mitigation, energy efficiency or redistributive measures. In 
addition, both, Cap and Dividend and Cap and Share are in principle scalable, 
in other words they can be applied globally, nationally or just within a specific 
economic sector (for example transport, as recently considered by the Irish 
government (AEA Energy & Environment and Cambridge Econometrics 
2008)).  
Whilst all three approaches, Tax and Share, Cap and Share and Cap 
and Dividend would have similar distributional effects, the latter two are 
preferable from an environmental point of view as they provide certainty over 
the level of emission reduction by defining an emissions cap, a feature that 
does not exist within tax schemes.  
Finally, Personal Carbon Allowance (PCAs) schemes are similar to 
Cap and Share/Dividend in that they also set a cap on CO2 emissions and 
allocate equal per capita carbon budgets to each individual citizen. The 
carbon permits are tradable so that those how who are able to use fewer 
permits than their overall budget can sell them on and those who require more 
need to buy additional permits. Whilst the distributional effects will be similar 
to Tax/Cap and Share/Dividend schemes, PCAs are a downstream approach 
that generates transaction costs that are an order of magnitude higher. In 
addition, as it is still very difficult to verify embedded emissions from general 
consumption, caps within PCAs usually do not cover emissions from the 
whole economy but only certain areas such as home energy or personal 
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transport. They would therefore be far less effective from an environmental 
point of view than the upstream schemes. 
To sum up, from an environmental and social point of view, climate 
mitigation instruments that auction off tradable emission permits would be 
more effective than a carbon tax. Trading schemes that issue (part of) the 
revenue directly to the citizens such as Cap and Share or Cap and Dividend 
also seem to be preferable from a social perspective. This point will be further 
discussed in the following section. 
 
3. Distributional effects of climate mitigation policies 
In the previous section we argued that sharing out the revenue from climate 
mitigation policies to the citizens is preferable to giving it to companies or the 
government for a number of reasons. For example, we simply assumed that 
giving them to citizens on an equal per capita basis has progressive effects. Is 
this really the case and if so why? To examine this question we will analyse 
the distributional effects of CO2 reduction policies that do not share out the 
revenue to the public and investigate further details of potential distributional 
effects from Tax/Cap and Share/Dividend Schemes.  
First of all, however, let us estimate what volume of revenue climate 
mitigation policies might yield and what it would add to the current level of 
revenue from environmental taxes and levies. According to Eurostat, revenue 
from environmental taxes (energy, transport, pollution) has slightly decreased 
within the EU-25 (EU-15) as a percentage of overall revenue from 6.98 (7.71) 
in 1995 to 6.16 (6.79) in 2007. This might partly be due to the unpopularity of 
taxes on transport fuels and home energy as well as to a reduction in energy 
use induced by environmental taxes. What volume of revenue could be added 
to this if all the EU ETS CO2 emission permits (EU Allowance Unit, EAU) were 
auctioned at a price of €30/t CO2? It is estimated that the EU will issue 
approximately 2.1 (1.6) billion EAUs annually, each of which equivalent to one 
tonne of CO2, within the second trading period (2008-12) within the EU-27 
(EU-15) (EEA 2008: 86). If all the allowances were auctioned during the 
second trading period at a price of €30 per tonne of CO2, this would yield an 
annual revenue of €63 (€48) billion within the whole EU-27 which would 
provide an additional 1.13 (0.93) per cent of total state revenue within the EU-  14 
27 (EU-15) in 2008 – or 2.0 (1.6) per cent of total social expenditure in 2006 
within the EU-27 (EU-15).  
However, only a small fraction of EAUs will be auctioned within the 
second trading period and the price per EAU is currently far below €30 – at 
ca. €13 in July 2009. In addition, the EU ETS does not cover the total amount 
of CO2 emissions within the EU economy but only about 40-50%. Total CO2 
emissions within the EU-27 amounted to about 4.3 billion tonnes of CO2 in 
2006.
15 If emission permits for all CO2 emissions were auctioned at €30 per 
tonne or if a carbon tax of the same price would be introduced, this would 
yield a revenue of €129 billion which would have been about 2.32 per cent of 
total average government revenue or 4.11 per cent of social expenditure 
within the EU-27 in 2006. 
The distributional effects of CO2 reduction policies depend on various 
factors. First of all, it will be highly significant whether those who have to pay 
for the emissions are able to pass on the extra cost to their customers and 
ultimately citizens. In theory this depends on the elasticities of demand and 
supply in the various markets affected. Second, it will make a difference 
whether the policy only applies to the transport or home energy sector or 
whether all CO2 emissions are covered by “taxing” them at source. Third, the 
distributional effects will depend on whether or not compensatory packages 
will be offered to the citizens. It also depends crucially, as we shall illustrate, 
on the level of the cap. 
Whilst the literature on the distributive effects of carbon reduction 
policies is usually based on hypothetical econometric models, it clearly 
suggests that schemes that cover total CO2 emissions and that do not provide 
any compensation to citizens, have regressive effects. For example, a study 
on a hypothetical carbon tax of €20/t CO2 applied to energy use in Ireland 
found that such a tax would cost the poorest households just under €3 a week 
and the richest household just under €4 a week. It would therefore be 
regressive as the richest households would pay a considerably smaller 
proportion of their income than the poorest households (Callan, Lyons et al. 
2009). This confirms results of previous simulation studies on carbon taxes in 
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various EU countries (Symons, Proops et al. 1994; Speck 1999; Symons, 
Speck et al. 2002), including one study on existing CO2, home energy and 
transport taxes in Denmark (Wier, Birr-Pedersen et al. 2005) (see figure 1).  
 
Figure 1: Direct and indirect household tax payments by income deciles (1996) 
 
Source: Wier, Pedersen et al 2005: 245. The left hand scale is for the bar chart.  
 
These results are due to patterns of consumption – and related CO2 
emissions – within society. While household CO2 emissions augment with 
rising income, its increase is less rapid than the increase in household 
income. Therefore, low income households spend on average a higher 
proportion of their income on energy than rich households and any 
proportional increase of energy expenses will be a greater relative financial 
burden on low income households than on high income households.  
This pattern is particularly evident if one excludes transport and 
examines home energy separately. For example, Dresner & Ekins (2006) 
modelled the distributional effect of a hypothetical carbon tax on home energy 
of £10/t CO2 and found that whilst it meant an extra expense of £66.56 per 
year for a household in the highest income decile in comparison to £36.92 for 
a household in the lowest income decile, this represented only 0.12 per cent 
of the high income households in comparison to 0.51 per cent of the low 
income households (see table 1). 
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Table 1: Effect of a carbon tax on all households 
 
Source: Dresner/Ekins 2006: 55 
 
However, the picture is likely to look different if a carbon or energy tax is only 
applied to transport fuels. For instance, Dresner & Ekins (2004) have argued 
that a petrol tax would tend to be progressive if all households are included 
because low-income households are less likely to have a car than high-come 
households. However, they estimate that a petrol tax would still be regressive 
amongst motorists (ibid: 2). An earlier study by Barker & Köhler (1998: 384) 
also demonstrated that low income households in 11 EU member states spent 
a smaller proportion of their income on transport than high income households 
– exactly the opposite picture in comparison to home energy expenditure.  
Whilst more research in this area is required to determine the different 
distributional effects of CO2 reduction policies in different areas of 
consumption, the studies quoted in the beginning of this section suggest that 
the progressive effects in the area of transport are outweighed by the 
regressive effects of home energy and embedded CO2 so that a general CO2 
tax is still likely to have a regressive effect. 
 
What does this imply for CO2 reduction policies that allocate equal per capital 
emission allowances to each individual adult citizen or rebate the revenue 
from a carbon tax or emission permits on an equal per capita basis to them? If 
an equal CO2 emission allowance (or the money arising from selling the 
equivalent emission permit) is given to each citizen, it follows that all 
households/citizens that emit less than the volume of emissions covered by 
the allowance will gain through such a scheme whilst all those who emit more   17 
will lose. If low-income households on average emit less CO2 than covered by 
the allowance whilst high income households on average emit more, it follows 
that such a scheme would be progressive.  
This assumption is confirmed by a recent study of the British 
Department for Environment, Food and Rural Affairs (DEFRA) that estimated 
the distributional effect of a Personal Carbon Allowance scheme according to 
which emissions were capped at the current level and 40 per cent of carbon 
permits given to individuals for free (DEFRA 2008: 8f.). The DEFRA study 
found that, on average, low income households would be able to retain a 
surplus of allowances (which they would the be able to sell) whilst high-
income households would need to buy additional permits as their lifestyle 
would leave them with an allowance deficit (see figure 2). A recent study that 
modelled potential effects of a Cap and Share scheme in Ireland generated 
similar results in terms of its distributional impact (AEA Energy & Environment 
and Cambridge Econometrics 2008: 129). 
 
Figure 2: Allowance surplus/deficit and income 
 
Source: DEFRA 2008: 25 
 
However, the literature on distributional effects of CO2 reduction policies also 
argues that the relationship between emissions and income is actually 
relatively weak because there is a considerable variation of emissions within 
income deciles. For instance, Dresner & Ekins (2006) only found a correlation 
of 0.131 between income and CO2 emissions from home energy use. In other   18 
words, income only explained 13.1 per cent of the variation in emissions. In 
fact they maintained that variation in emissions was smaller between income 
deciles than within income deciles (ibid: 52).  
This is also confirmed by the DEFRA study on Personal Carbon 
Allowances that found that whilst on average low-income households would 
gain from such a scheme, there is still a considerable proportion of low-
income households who would have to pay for an allowance deficit (see table 
2).  
 
Table 2: Distribution of gain and loss by equivalised income decile 
 
Source: DEFRA 2008: p. 3 
 
These results must be due partly to the fact that a range of variables other 
than income determine household CO2 emissions.
16 In fact, the DEFRA 
(2008) study also provides insight into the role of other variables such as 
household size, size of the home, type of dwelling and rural/urban location. 
On average, larger households tend to have an allowance surplus. Large 
households emit less CO2 per person than smaller households, due to 
economies of scale. However, each adult within the household would still 
receive an equal emission allowance, therefore putting larger households at 
an advantage in comparison to smaller households (ibid: 5).  
                                                
16  There  are  also  methodological  problems  arising  from  the  data  collection  process  in 
consumption surveys. It is well-known, for example, that infrequency of purchase of motor fuel 
will lead to over dispersion of the estimated distribution when figures from a consumption 
diary period are extrapolated to estimates of annual consumption.   19 
CO2 emissions also tend to rise with the number of rooms within a 
home as they require higher energy use for heating. This puts small 
households who live in large homes (under-occupying) at a disadvantage.  
The type of dwelling also had a considerable impact on permit 
allowances/deficits. On average, people living in flats had the highest surplus, 
followed by people living in terraced or semi-detached houses respectively. 
People living in detached houses had on average an allowance deficit (ibid: 
28). This is related to the energy environment of different types of dwelling, 
with flats being more energy efficient than detached houses.  
Finally, geographical location seems to be of high relevance in relation 
to household CO2 emissions. As one might expect, households in urban areas 
had, on average, allowance surpluses whilst households in fringe areas, 
villages and isolated areas had increasing allowance deficits in the order 
mentioned (ibid: 30). Interestingly, the DEFRA study found that this was 
largely related to home energy – due to less efficient heating infrastructure 
and less access to gas in rural areas – rather than transport emissions. 
However, the DEFRA study does not take aviation and public transport into 
account which might change this picture, nor are indirect emissions included 
in these estimates. 
 
Another dimension that needs to be taken into account in examining potential 
distributive effects of schemes that provide each individual citizen with equal 
per capita rebates or emission allowances is whether the scheme is 
introduced at the national or global level. Whether or not such schemes are 
progressive in developed countries depends on the size of the per capita 
permit in relation to average emissions from low income households. If the per 
capita allowance was lower than average emissions from low income 
households, such schemes are likely to be regressive in developed countries 
as even the poor would have emission deficits and needed to pay more for 
them as a proportion of their income than rich households. Let us, for 
example, imagine that a global Cap and Share/Dividend scheme was 
introduced tomorrow which set the per capita allowance at 3.3 tonnes per 
person – slightly lower than the current estimated per capita emission of 3.5 to 
4 tonnes per personal worldwide. This per capita allowance is considerably   20 
lower than the current average emissions in developed countries like the UK 
(9.8 tonnes per person) or the US (20.6 tonnes per person) (UN 2007: table 
24)
17. The money resulting from selling the CO2 permits would not cover the 
increased cost that even low income households had to bear from their CO2 
emissions and would therefore be regressive. Of course, such a scheme 
would result in an immense redistribution from developed to developing 
countries (cf. Sharan 2008; Wakeford 2008, for estimated distributional effects 
of a global Cap and Share scheme on India and South Africa respectively). 
However, potential regressive effects of such global schemes can 
probably be avoided by differentiating an overall global cap into “regionalised” 
or even national caps which could still allow developing countries a rise in per 
capita emissions and a per capita reduction of emissions in rich countries, but 
not at such extreme levels that would be achieved by an immediate move 
towards a globally equal per capita allowance.   
In addition, there is a range of additional compensatory measures that 
could, if designed appropriately, help to reduce regressive effects or target 
low-income losers within overall progressive schemes. Subsidies or loans for 
home insulation and micro-generation of renewable energy or lower electricity 
and gas tariffs for low income households, as well as subsidies for public 
transport are possible examples that require further investigation. There is a 
clear synergy between emissions reduction policies and energy efficiency 
measures. On the one hand, without action to curb emissions, efficiency 
measures are likely to ‘backfire.’
18 This is because the price of energy 
services decreases, generating a substitution effect favouring higher 
consumption of those services, and secondly any savings may be spent 
elsewhere in the economy, an income effect resulting in increased energy use 
in the economy as a whole (Polimeni, Mayumi et al. 2009). On the other hand, 
without such efficiency measures the rapid reduction in emissions that the 
                                                
17 These figures reflect emission levels in 2004 and do not include emissions from imported 
goods and services.  
18 “Backfiring” is a more extreme case than the probably more well-known concept of the 
“rebound effect”. “Rebound” exists if the reduction in energy use due to energy efficiency 
measures is partly, but not completely compensated by increases in consumption. Within 
“backfiring”, no net energy savings are generated as rising consumption fully eliminates or 
even exceeds any energy efficiency savings.    21 
climate scientists are calling for might result in unacceptably low standards of 
living. 
 
Discussion and conclusion 
This paper posed the question of whether climate mitigation schemes that 
share out the revenue that they generate to the population on an equal per 
capita basis could be a new source of financing the welfare state. To discuss 
this issue it is worth to review the general proposition that combining climate 
and social policies will reap benefits. Here, two aspects can be distinguished. 
First one needs to elaborate whether the revenue from climate mitigation 
policies could and should be used to fill increasing gaps in financing the 
welfare state. Second, it is a separate issue to ask whether the revenue 
should be used to avoid regressive effects.  
Regarding the first aspect, governments would generally be free to use 
part or all of the revenue from selling emission permits or levying carbon taxes 
to increase funding for the welfare state, for example to finance pension and 
long term care schemes, top up means-tested benefits or child benefit. The 
drawback here is that if this link is made explicit, critics can easily accuse 
those climate mitigation policies to be just a means of expanding the welfare 
state through the backdoor. This is likely to generate political opposition to 
policies that are desperately required. Conversely, if it is not made explicit that 
the revenue from climate mitigation policies is used for redistributive 
purposes, these policies’ regressiveness will be at the forefront of public 
perception, potentially generating public resistance, as the more indirect 
recycling of the revenue for social purposes is less directly visible. 
In addition, one might argue that rather than using the revenue from 
climate change mitigation policies to finance the welfare state, it should be 
ring-fenced and re-invested into energy efficiency measures, renewables, 
public transport infrastructure, etc. (e.g. Tickell 2008). From this perspective, 
environmental and social policies should be kept separate.  
However, from a social policy perspective, there are strong arguments 
to design climate change mitigation policies in ways that do not entail 
regressive effects. Generally, decision-makers in the field of social policy must 
be aware that the current practice of giving emission permits to (energy)   22 
companies for free runs counter to the intentions of the welfare state. 
Increases in energy prices hit low-income households hardest. Hence, it is 
them who pay for the windfall profits reaped by the energy companies. From 
this perspective, “recycling” the revenue from CO2 reduction schemes and, for 
instance, redistributing an equal per capita share could just be regarded as an 
adjacent measure that compensates the population for increasing prices of 
energy and other goods and services, based on the assumption that every 
citizen has the same right to use (pollute) the atmosphere which is a common 
good (Barnes 2003). The government could still use part of this revenue to 
provide low-income households with free insulation, loans for micro electricity-
generation and free public transport tokens. Whilst the latter are not social 
policy measures in the stricter sense, they may have redistributive effects and 
might be required to help less well-off people to move towards low carbon 
lifestyles.  
 
A more specific question is whether a tax/cap and share/dividend scheme 
would be an appropriate measure to link climate change mitigation with social 
policies. Again, it is useful to distinguish the purpose of filling emerging gaps 
in financing the welfare state more generally from the mitigation of regressive 
effects.  
Regarding the former, it is likely that such schemes would not be a 
long-term solution to fill gaps in welfare state resources. First of all, it is 
difficult to determine the exact size of the revenue from either a carbon tax or 
a cap and share/dividend scheme. Whilst the price that a carbon tax puts on 
CO2 emissions is fixed and therefore calculable for individuals or companies, 
the resulting revenue depends on the scale of behaviour change (determined 
by price elasticities of demand and the rate by which high carbon activities are 
replaced by low/zero carbon activities) that such a tax invokes. Obviously, the 
greater the environmental benefit, i.e. the greater the reduction of carbon 
emissions, the smaller will be the revenue. Also within a cap and 
share/dividend scheme, it is difficult to determine the exact revenue that might 
be raised. Whilst the volume of emissions that will occur during the period for 
which the cap was set will be known (assuming that there is sufficient demand 
so that all issued permits will be used), the price of each permit will be   23 
determined through the market, mainly depending on the balance between 
supply and demand of allowances. If demand for permits is low, for example 
during a time of recession, the price of allowances will fall and therefore 
diminish the resulting revenue. However, this problem could be tackled by 
introducing a “floor” price for carbon permits. 
Whilst both, carbon taxes and cap and trade schemes are likely to 
raise significant volumes of revenue in the short run, both aim, in the long run, 
at reducing the scale of activities which are the source for this revenue. The 
revenue from a carbon tax will fall over time if carbon intensive activities are 
replaced by low carbon activities. Assuming that there will be a move towards 
a low carbon economy, this would equally involve a falling demand for carbon 
permits under a cap and trade scheme so that even though the traded volume 
of permits decreases year on year, the price would not necessarily increase 
due to falling demand. Within this scenario, the revenue from cap and trade 
schemes would also fall over time. In other words, carbon mitigation policies 
are designed such that if they work properly, the resulting revenue would 
decline in the long run, and thus would not provide a basis for ongoing finance 
of increasing welfare state demands.
19  
This leaves us with the question of whether sharing out the revenue 
from CO2 reduction policies on an equal per capita basis is an appropriate 
measure to mitigate regressive effects of necessary climate policies. Suffice it 
here to summarise two main points that have been discussed in section three. 
The first is that whilst equal per capita shares would be progressive on 
average, there would still be a considerable number of low-income “losers” 
from such schemes. Whilst more research is required to identify the factors 
that determine the likelihood of low income households losing out under such 
schemes, a plausible initial assumption is that low income households in rural 
areas, living in poorly insulated, isolated homes, without access to gas (i.e. 
more dependent on oil for heating which has a greater CO2 intensity per kWh) 
and limited access to public transport, as well as low-income elderly people 
who “over-occupy” large houses will be particularly vulnerable. Such 
                                                
19 The other side of the coin is that those who profit from auctioning off emission permits or 
from emissions trading have an interest in a more gradual reduction of the cap – once the cap 
is set to zero, this source of revenue or profit would dry up. This issue may be an additional 
justification for the cap to be set by an independent commission.    24 
inequalities can be addressed by ring-fencing part of the revenue for specific 
measures, targeting those vulnerable groups.  
The second issue is that if cap and share/dividend schemes are 
introduced at a global scale, they are likely to have regressive effects in all 
those countries in which the carbon footprint of even the lowest income 
deciles is above world average – or any amount just below world average to 
which the overall cap will be set. This could be mitigated through redistributive 
measures financed from national government budgets, however, it would add 
additional pressure on already tight welfare resources. Alternatively, the 
global cap within cap and share/dividend schemes could be scaled nationally 
or regionally, setting different per capita allowances/shares in these different 
areas on the basis of previous emissions and moving much more slowly to an 
equal per capita share globally. Whilst this considerably reduces the scale of 
global redistribution and violates the principle that every world citizen should 
have the same right to use (pollute) the atmosphere, it might be a preferable 
option as it is more likely to win public support and to be financially viable.  
Our overall conclusion therefore is that whilst it might be more problematic to 
explicitly or implicitly use the revenue from climate change mitigation to fill 
gaps in financing the welfare state, it is necessary to design climate change 
mitigation policies such that they do not put already vulnerable groups in 
society at a disadvantage. Whilst cap and share/dividend schemes do not 
provide perfect solutions as they need to be carefully designed to avoid 
unjustified disadvantages (low-income “losers”) or public opposition (due to 
regressive effects if a global equal per capita share is introduced right at the 
start), there are ways in which these negative effects can be prevented. This 
makes them a promising tool for designing equitable and effective climate 
change mitigation policies. 
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